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Abstract. The Lucas tree model [Lucas RE Jr (1978) Asset prices in an exchange economy.
Econometrica 46(6):1429–1445.] lies at the heart of modern macrofinance. At its core, it
provides an analysis of the equilibrium price of a long-lived asset in an exchange economy
where consumption is the objective and the sole purpose of the asset is to smooth con-
sumption through time. Experimental tests of the model use a particular instantiation of the
Lucasmodel.Herewe adopt a different instantiation to thefirst two, extending their analyses
from a two-period oscillating world to a three-period cyclical world; this is partly to test the
robustness of their results. We also go one step further and compare this solution (to a
consumption-smoothing problem), in which consumption claims are traded via the long-
lived asset, with the alternative solution provided by a market, in which agents can directly
trade (short-lived) consumption claims between periods. We find that the latter exchange
economy is more efficient in encouraging consumption smoothing than the economy with
the long-lived asset. We find evidence of uncompetitive trading in both markets.
History: Accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.
Open Access Statement: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License. You are free to copy, distribute, transmit and adapt this work, but you must attribute this
work as “Management Science. Copyright © 2021 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020
.3855, used under a Creative Commons Attribution License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/.”
Funding: The scientific research presented in this publication received financial support from theNational
Research Fund of Luxembourg (INTER/MOBILITY/12/5685107 and INTER/RCUK/16/11555355)
was supported by The National Research Fund of Luxembourg [Grant F2R-368 LSF-PMA-13SYSB].
Supplemental Material: The data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3855.
Keywords: asset market experiment • Lucas tree model • Bewley incomplete markets • intertemporal choice • exchange economy •
general equilibrium • consumption smoothing • credit market • Herfindahl index • term structure of Sharpe ratios
1. Introduction
The motivation of this paper is to study and compare
the performance of two exchange economies, one for a
long-lived asset and the other one for a short-lived
asset (in both of which agents can indirectly or di-
rectly trade consumption through time) with respect
to two intertwined key items of interest: (1) whether
agents smooth their consumption through time and
(2) whether the market manages to reach its equi-
librium price.
We start with an experimental test of a particular
instantiation of the Lucas (1978) tree model. In its
simplest form, this model considers an infinite discrete-
period world in which there is perishable money
(apples) and a long-lived asset (the tree) which pays a
dividend in money. Income, in the form of money,
varies from period to period; utility is derived from
end-of-period money holdings. With a concave utility
function, which is the way we induce preferences for
consumption smoothing and trading in the experi-
ment, it is desirable for end-of-period money holdings
to be smoothed through time. This can only be achieved
by individuals trading the long-lived asset in an asset
market; so the role of the asset market is solely to fa-
cilitate end-of-period money holdings smoothing.
Key previous experimental papers are those of
Crockett et al. (2019), Asparouhova et al. (2016), and
Halim et al. (2016). All three papers use oscillating
two-cycle fixed incomes to induce motives for trade.
Crockett et al. (2019) and Halim et al. (2016) have a
long-lived asset with a fixed dividend as the only means
of smoothing consumption through time. Asparouhova
et al. (2016) have two long-lived assets, one with a
stochastic dividend and the other one being a fixed
income security, where both can be used to smooth
consumption. We advance the literature by using
1
three-cycle incomes, which increases the complexity
of the problem faced by the subjects and tests the
robustness of previous results.
Further, we take the idea of the Asparouhova
et al. (2016) paper of two assets and split them be-
tween two treatments (having one bond-like and one
stock-like asset but both involving fixed income streams
like the other two papers), so that we can isolate the
comparative static impact of asset duration on price
relative to fundamental value.
Splitting the asset duration by treatment, along
with the step function simplification (which we shall
describe shortly), allows us to see in the data to what
extent asset complexity and induced payoff com-
plexity impede convergence to fundamental value and
how much relative noise is involved in that process.
We report important comparative static results. Our
treatments have significant implications in intuitively
understandable and interesting directions. It is im-
portant and interesting that the markets achieve regu-
larities by treatment despite the increased complexity
of a three-cycle income environment.
The Lucas model is set in an infinite horizon world
with constant discounting. At the beginning of the
problem, each agent is given a one-off endowment of
the long-lived asset, which pays in every period a
constant dividend, that is, a fixed amount of (per-
ishable) money. In each period, each agent gets, in
addition, a time-varying (and deterministic) endow-
ment of money. In order to implement this in the
laboratory, we adopted the usual experimenter’s method
of replacing an infinite horizon world with constant
discounting by a random horizon world with a constant
continuation probability; this latter being the equivalent
of the constant discount factor. This meant that any
particular repetition (which we called a “sequence”) of
the Lucas model would last a random number of
periods. We told subjects that there would be a ran-
dom number of sequences. At the beginning of each
sequence, the endowments of the asset were reset to
their initial values, and everything was started afresh,
giving us several repetitions of tests of the Lucas model.
We add to the previous literature by comparing this
(long-lived) asset market solution (to a consumption-
smoothing problem) with an alternative market for
a short-lived asset, which we call the “credit
market.”1 In this market, agents can directly trade
consumption in the current period (apples) for claims
of consumption in the next period (future apples).
With our experimental data, we evaluate the Sharpe
ratios of asset returns of short-term and long-term
assets in a between-subjects setting. In contrast to
the declining term-structure of real-world Sharpe
ratios with maturity (van Binsbergen et al. 2012, van
Binsbergen and Koijen 2017), we find no such decline
with our assets.
In summary, this paper contains three major dif-
ferences from the previous literature: (1) we extend
the two-period (oscillating) framework of Crockett
et al. (2019) to a three-period (cyclical) framework; (2)
we compare behaviour in the asset market with that
in a credit market; (3) we also examine the effect of
changing the payoff function from a concave function
to a step function. We briefly explain why we have
done these three things.
Our move to a three-period (cyclical) framework
follows that of Friedman et al. (1984, p. 364). They
simply state that they “extend that analysis to 3-
periodassetmarkets,”we suspect to test the robustness
of their results. It is well known that decision makers
have problems in solving dynamic decision problems
and are notoriously myopic. The oscillating case
studied byCrockett et al. (2019) is relatively simple: in
the steady state, decision makers only have to plan
one period ahead; in the cyclical case, they have to
plan two periods ahead and backwardly induct from
two periods hence. If one looks at the optimal strat-
egies in Tables 1 and 2, the solution is by no means
obvious, even in structure: buying in two periods and
selling in one or buying in one period and selling in
two. Note also that the two-period cycle studied by
Crockett et al. (2019) is the simplest possible envi-
ronment of its class, so it is important to study
whether consumption smoothing continues to hap-
pen if the environment gets more complicated.
Our extension to a comparison of behaviour in an
(long-lived) asset market with that in a (short-lived)
credit market is motivated by the idea that the equilib-
rium is more obvious in the latter: the expected value
calculation for the short-lived asset is straightforward for
subjects as we explain in Section 3. In contrast, the
calculation of equilibrium in the (long-lived) asset
market requires the computation of the expected
value of future dividends over an infinite horizon.
We have not yet mentioned our extension to a step
payment function. This will be described in detail
later, but it is simple to describe: with this, the
mapping from end-of-period token holdings into
money for the subject is a step function with a single
step (see the left-hand graph in Figure 1)—above this
step payment is £1, below it £0. This is effectively
telling the subjects that the best thing to do is aim
for end-of-period token holdings equal to the step.2
We deliberately fix this step at the equilibrium level.
Note that this is not telling them how to get to equi-
librium—which is thewhole point of the trading—but
to see if the market can converge to the equilibrium
when all subjects know what the equilibrium is. We
isolate the equilibrium from the problem of achiev-
ing it.
This paper starts with a literature review. We then
outline the exchange economymodelwith the long-lived
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asset, interpreting it from the perspective of our exper-
iment;wederive thekeypropositions, particularly about
the equilibriumasset price and consumption-smoothing,
that we test with our experiment. We then derive the
corresponding solution for the exchange economy with
the short-lived asset. We then discuss our experimental
design, before reporting the key findings in the experi-
ment. Finally, we conclude, exploring the implications
of our findings.
2. Literature Review
There is a vast experimental literature from the 1980s
on asset markets, which has enhanced our under-
standing of price formation in asset markets. Early
studies like Plott and Sunder (1982), Forsythe et al.
(1982), and Friedman et al. (1984) motivated agents to
trade by providing heterogeneous dividend values.
They found that the market price tends to converge
toward the rational expectation value. Smith et al.
(1988) introduced a design in which all investors
receive the same dividend from a known probabil-
ity distribution at the end of the T trading periods;
they found that this design tended to generate price
bubbles. In general, researchers have shown that
the phenomenon of asset price bubble is robust to a
variety of changes in the market structure (see van
Boening et al. 1993, Porter and Smith 1995, Caginalp
et al. 1998, Lei et al. 2001, Dufwenberg et al. 2005,
Haruvy and Noussair 2006, Haruvy et al. 2007,
Hussam et al. 2008, and Kirchler et al. 2012). In these
Table 2. Credit Market Parameters and Equilibrium
Type 1 subjects Type 2 subjects Type 3 subjects
Periods 1, 4, 7, . . . Tokens income 109 59 69
Receipt from making credit contract −30 20 10
End-of-period tokens 79 79 79
Periods 2, 5, 8, . . . Tokens income 53 123 61
Receipt from delivering on credit contract 36 −24 −12
Receipt from making credit contract −10 −20 30
End-of-period tokens 79 79 79
Periods 3, 6, 9, . . . Tokens income 67 55 115
Receipt from delivering on credit contract 12 24 −36
End-of-period tokens 79 79 79
Note. Items in bold are exogenous.








Periods 1, 4, 7, . . . Initial assets 0 5 5
Dividend income from initial assets 0 10 10
Units of the asset sold −3 2 1
Income from selling assets −30 20 10
Next period assets 3 3 4
Tokens income 109 49 59
End-of-period tokens 79 79 79
Periods 2, 5, 8, . . . Initial assets 3 3 4
Dividend income from initial assets 6 6 8
Units of the asset sold 2 −4 2
Income from selling assets 20 −40 20
Next period assets 1 7 2
Tokens income 53 113 51
End-of-period tokens 79 79 79
Periods 3, 6, 9, . . . Initial assets (trees) 1 7 2
Dividend income from initial assets 2 14 4
Units of the asset sold 1 2 −3
Income from selling assets 10 20 −30
Next period assets 0 5 5
Tokens income 67 45 105
End-of-period tokens 79 79 79
Notes. Items in bold are exogenous. Items in bold italics are exogenous in the first period of a sequence.
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studies, a market was created for a dividend-paying
asset with a lifetime of a finite number of periods with
the asset structure being common knowledge. An-
other stream of literature studied the static capital
asset pricing model in the laboratory with only asset-
derived income and no labour/endowment income;
the main studies here are Bossaerts and Plott (2002),
Asparouhova et al. (2003), and Bossaerts et al. (2007).
Another relevant strand of experimental literature
concerns consumption smoothing. Earlier experimental
work on consumption smoothing includes Hey and
Dardanoni (1988), Carbone and Hey (2004), Nous-
sair andMatheny (2000), Lei andNoussair (2002), and
Ballinger et al. (2003). The received literature con-
sidered consumption smoothing as an individual
choice problem in the familiar life cycle consumption
model (for example, Hey 1980). Differently from the
market approach presented here, individuals smooth
their income stream over a fixed number of periods
through saving at fixed interest rate. The general finding
of this literature is that subjects smooth consumption
but do so inefficiently (see Duffy 2016 for a survey).
In our experimental design, we follow and extend
the design of Crockett et al. (2019) for testing the
Lucas model with heterogeneous agents and time-
varying private income streams. In each session of
Crockett et al. (2019), 12 subjects exchanged assets
against cash in an indefinite horizon world. The in-
definite horizon was implemented by a roll of a six-
sided die, implying a continuing probability of five/
six. In this exchange economy, individuals have a
motive to trade the asset inorder to smooth consumption
between periods. Crockett et al. (2019) had subjects
trading an asset in the market, which paid a certain
dividend (two cash units in one, three in another
treatment) at the beginning of each period to asset
holders. After each period, one subject rolled the die
and a six would terminate the session. Crockett
et al. (2019) reported strong evidence for consump-
tion smoothing and found that prices were close to
equilibrium in their main treatment. In comparison
with the asset market of Crockett et al. (2019), we
examine a more complex setting by increasing the
level of induced agent heterogeneity: in our design,
we have three different types of agents with cyclical
incomes, whereas Crockett et al. (2019) had two dif-
ferent types with alternating high and low incomes.
Asparouhova et al. (2016) also investigate the Lucas
tree model in an indefinite horizon world, but there
are two important differences in their design to
ours and also to that of Crockett et al. (2019). First,
Asparouhova et al. (2016) had subjects trade two se-
curities for cash; a fixed-income consol that pays 0.5
cash units in each period and a risky asset, which pays
zero (bad state) or one cash unit (good state)
according to the state of the economy. Half of the
subjects are endowed with units of the consol; the
other half are endowed with units of the risky asset.
Their cash endowments alternated over periods. Our
asset corresponds rather to the consol than the risky
asset inAsparouhova et al. as the stopping probability
is the only exogenous risk in our setting. In the design
of Asparouhova et al., subjects simultaneously price
two long-lived securities in the market. The risky
asset in their design and its transition probabilities
from good to bad states implies complications for
Figure 1. (Color online) The Conversion Scales from Tokens to Money
Note. In step treatment, payoff is £1 at or above 79 tokens and zero otherwise; concave function payoff is £π/100, where π = 309.5734 –
1,307,948 × (#tokens)-2, yielding £0 at 65 and £1 at 79 tokens.
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subjects’ expectations and forecasts of equilibriumprices
(in this context,Asparouhova et al. (2016, p. 2731) refer to
“residual price forecasting risk”). Such forecasting
risk is absent in our setting. Second, in that paper,
subjects consume the cash they hold at the end of the
final period only. Thus, Asparouhova et al. induce
preference for consumption smoothing through the
stopping probability rather than through the choice of
the payoff function aswe do. The purpose of the study
of Asparouhova et al. is to look at risk avoidance via
diversification and market reaction. Their results
provide support for their qualitative pricing and
consumption predictions; prices move with funda-
mentalsandagents smoothconsumption.At thesametime,
nevertheless, the data sharply differ from the quantitative
predictions as asset prices display excess volatility to the
point that the equity premium is negative in good times,
and subjects do not hedge price risks. Asparouhova et al.
conclude that the deviations of the data from the model
arise through the disagreement of subjects’ expectations
with respect to the underlying perfect foresight model.
Crockett et al. (2019) and also Asparouhova et al.
(2016) suggest that the consumption smoothing mo-
tive can imply a tendency of asset prices to reflect
fundamentals. Halim et al. (2016) directly tested this
hypothesis in an indefinite horizon setting (with
stopping probability one/six), where subjects ex-
changed a risky asset that paid zero (bad state) or one
cash unit (good state) for cash in the market. In their
design, some subjects had a constant endowment
in each period and thus no induced trading motive;
consumption smoothing would require no trade. Other
subjects had different endowments in odd and even
periods, and thus consumption smoothing required
trade. Halim et al. (2016) report that market prices
are higher in the presence of subjects with no in-
duced trading motive than when subjects must trade
for consumption smoothing. Interestingly, Halim et al.
(2016) report overpricing of assets compared with the
risk-neutral fundamental value in all their treatments.
In line with Crockett et al. (2019), Asparouhova
et al. (2016), and Halim et al. (2016), our partici-
pants are motivated to engage in trade in order to
offset income fluctuations they face over time; therefore,
the main reason for trading should be consumption
smoothing. In sharp contrast to these studies, we also
study a credit-market where short-lived securities are
transacted. Thus, we are able to compare consumption
smoothing and price discovery in markets with long-
lived versus short-lived securities. This is one of our
key contributions.3
Noussair and Popescu (2019) also contribute to the
experimental literature on the Lucas treemodel. Their
design involves two long-lived assets with stochastic
dividends to study the research question whether
asset prices comove with another when an independent
shock occurs to one asset but not to the other. Noussair
and Popescu (2019) report evidence for comovement
in line with theory but report a price drift of the
nonshocked asset beyond the theoretical prediction.
Besides the Lucas tree model, the Bewley model
is another important heterogeneous-agent dynamic
general equilibrium exchange economy model (see
the survey by Heathcote et al. 2009).4 In this model,
the consumer’s labour income is subject to a shock. A
riskless short-term asset facilitates individual con-
sumption smoothing between periods. Our exchange
economy involving short-lived asset claims shares
important features with the Bewley model and leads
to identical equilibrium consumption as the Lucas
tree model in our design. Thus, we are able to com-
pare consumption smoothing and pricing in markets
with long-lived versus short-lived securities. We are
not aware of any other study that investigates the
pricing and consumption smoothing with short-lived
asset claims in the laboratory. Van Binsbergen and
Koijen (2017) show that the real-world term structure
of returns is downward sloping in maturities across
various asset classes including bonds and equity.
Their finding is at odds with the standard model,
which suggests nondecreasing expected returns. In
contrast, our laboratory results on Sharpe ratio structure
are not in conflict with the standard model.5
3. Background Theory
We start by describing the exchange economy of the
long-lived security, beforewe turn to that of the short-
lived security. We confine our discussion to one
repetition of the Lucas treemodel; this is equivalent to
one sequence in our experiment—all sequences were
identical in structure. The scenario is as follows. There
are a number of individuals in society. There is per-
ishable money (apples) and a durable asset (the tree),
and there is a market in the asset. There is a fixed
aggregate amount of the asset, with the initial en-
dowments differing from individual to individual.
Each unit of the asset earns a fixed and knownmoney
dividend d each period. Individuals receive, each
period, an exogenously determined quantity of money,
mt, with this differing from individual to individual.
During each period, individuals can exchange money
for the asset. The money holding of individuals at the
end of each period is converted into utility and ag-
gregated over the lifetime to determine aggregate
utility. Utility in period t is given by u(ct), where u(.)
is the (concave) conversion scale into money and
where ct (end-of-period money) is given by
ct  mt + dat − pLt(at+1 − at),
where at is the asset holding at the beginning of
period t and pLt is the price of the asset in period t.
Carbone, Hey, and Neugebauer: An Experimental Comparison of Two Exchange Economies
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The optimising decision for any (risk-neutral6) indi-





subject to the expression above. Here β is the indi-
vidual’s discount factor.
The first-order condition for the optimal decision in
period t is
u’(ct)pLt  βu’(ct+1)(pLt+1 + d).
In equilibrium, because the conversion scale is con-
cave, the individualwants to smooth consumption, so
we have that u’(ct)=u’(ct+1), and hence we get pLt =
Etβ(pLt+1+d).





This is the constant steady-state equilibrium durable
asset price, which implies constant equilibrium returns
in our setting. It has the obvious interpretation as being
the discounted dividend income from holding one unit
of the asset.
We now consider the exchange economy featuring
the short-lived security. We will refer to this as the
credit market. In this, agents exchange, at some price,
perishable money units (apples) in one period for a
promise of money units in the following period (fu-
ture apples). Let us assume a constant credit market
price pS. If an individual wants to buy st money units
in period t, promising to pay back st+1 money units in
period t+1, then, at the price pS, he or she will have to
pay back pSst = st+1money units in t+1. The first-order
condition for the choice of st in period t is
u’(ct)  Etβu’(ct+1)pS,
where ct=mt−st and ct+1=mt+1+pSst.
Noting that mt and mt+1 are exogenous, the opti-
mality condition is u’(ct) = βpSu’(ct+1). Once again





This is the constant steady-state equilibrium credit
price (that is, the short-lived asset price). It has the
obvious interpretation7: in equilibrium, one unit of
money in period t is exchanged for pS units in period
t+1. Hence, in equilibrium, the discounted value of
one unit of money in t+1 is equal to the value of one
unit of money in t. The reasoning is straightforward:
if I sell one unit today for pS tomorrow (the price being
denoted by pS), my expected return is equal to βpS
(where β is the continuation probability). Thus, for a
risk-neutral agent we need 1 = βpS, and hence pS = 1/β,
in equilibrium.
4. The Experimental Implementation
There were 12 subjects in each experimental session.
Sessions involved either the (long-lived) asset market
or the credit (short-lived asset) market; no subject
participated in both. The session started with one of
the experimenters reading aloud over the tannoy8
system the instructions for the experiment9 and the
subjects simultaneously reading written instructions
in front of them. Subjects were then asked if they had
any questions on the structure of the experiment, and
any questions were answered. Afterward, each sub-
ject individually watched a video10 describing the
trading mechanism. Subjects were then asked if they
had any questions on the trading mechanism in the
experiment, and any questions were answered. They
were then given a practice period of trading, which
continued as long as they wanted. This did not count
toward payment.
The trading mechanism can be summarized as
follows. Subjects submitted limit orders to buy or sell.
The limit order stated a number for a price and a
number for a quantity. Both numbers could include
decimal places. For limit order submission in the asset
market, there were two price/quantity trading masks,
one for sells and one for buys. In the credit market,
subjects had the same two price/quantity masks as
in the asset market, but additionally they had two
quantity/quantity masks. In the quantity/quantity
masks, which they could use alternatively for order
submission, subjects detailed the quantity of current
tokens and the quantity of next-period tokens in ex-
change.11 Outstanding limit orders were visible on-
screen to all subjects in the order book, always re-
ported in price/quantity display, ordered by price.12
Limit orders of equal prices were ordered chrono-
logically by the time of arrival. Transactions were
immediately executed upon arrival of a marketable
limit order at the price of the outstanding limit order.
Unfilled parts of an outstanding limit order stayed in
the order book.
The instructions stated that the experiment would
consist of a random number of sequences each di-
vided into a random number of periods. In each
period, which lasted three minutes, trading of the
asset, or trading in the credit market, could be carried
out, using the familiar double-auction mechanism
implemented using Z-tree13 (Fischbacher 2007); for
recruitment, we used HRoot (Bock et al. 2014). As
already noted, we employed a random stopping
mechanism. At the end of every period of trading, one
of the subjects publicly rolled a six-sided die: if it
showed a number less than six, the sequence would
Carbone, Hey, and Neugebauer: An Experimental Comparison of Two Exchange Economies
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continue; if it showed a six, that particular sequence
would stop. In that case, if less than one hour had
elapsed since the start of the first sequence, a new
sequence would be started.14
In each period of the experiment, subjects were
endowed with an income denominated in tokens. In
our experiment, as we have already noted, there were
three types of subjects, four of each type, with their
token incomes varying cyclically. Type 1 subjects had
token incomes of 109, 53, 67, 109, 53, 67, and so on;
type 2 subjects had token incomes of 49, 113, 45, 49,
113, 45, and so on; type 3 subjects had token incomes
of 59, 51, 105, 59, 51, 105, and so on. All agents knew
what their token incomeswould be at the beginning of
each period of the experiment. They also knew their
endowments of the asset at the beginning of each
sequence (these were zero, five, and five for types 1, 2
and 3, respectively). Payment for each and every
period depended on howmany tokens they had at the
end of the period. We had two treatments that dif-
fered in terms of the conversion scale from end-of-
period tokens to money. These are illustrated in
Figure 1. We call them, respectively, the “step pay-
ment function” (treatment 1) and the “concave pay-
ment function” (treatment 2). With both functions, if
a subject ended a period with 79 tokens (the equi-
librium end-of-period token balance), they would
receive a payment of £1 for that period. With the step
payment function, the marginal gains of a subject are
infinite in the vicinity of 79 tokens if his or her end-of-
period balance falls short of 79 tokens and are zero
beyond that point. In contrast, with the concave
payment function, the marginal gains are smooth
around the 79 tokens benchmark.
In order to explain our choice of these two payment
functions, we need to show the parameters used in the
experiment and the implied equilibrium. In the ex-
periment, the dividend payment d was two and the
continuation probability was five/six. Hence, the (long-
lived asset) equilibrium price was 10 from Equation (2).
Table 1 shows the equilibrium. For example, type 1,
who starts off with no assets, should buy three units in
period 1, sell two units in period 2, and sell one unit in
period 3, thus getting back to zero holdings at the end
of the cycle (period 4). It will be seen from the table
that all three types in all periods have an end-of-
period token holding of 79. So they all smooth con-
sumption and all have the same smoothed consump-
tion. This explains our conversion scale in treatment 1:
effectively we were telling them that they should aim
for end-of-period token holdings of at least 79; this
guarantees them a payment of £1 each period. This,
of course, does not guarantee consumption smoothing
at 79 but it is a strong hint. It could be argued that
the step payment function makes the problem more
transparent; indeed that was our main reason for
introducing it. There are two elements to the solution:
(1) realising that consumption smoothing is optimal
and (2) calculating the level of consumption at which
to smooth. Treatment 1 effectively tells them the
answer to (2) and strongly hints at the answer to (1). It
is of interest to see whether the subjects responded to
these hints.
In treatment 2, we followed Crockett et al. (2019)
and had a smoothly concave conversion scale. Again,
end-of-period tokens of 79 leads to a payment of £1,
but there is nothing to guarantee that subjects will
consumption smooth. Notice that because of the
concavity of the scale, end-of-period token holdings
of less than 65 lead to losses; subjects were told that
losses would be offset against profits. We did not
allow them to trade in such a way that their token
holding would fall below 45
As far as the credit market is concerned, as once
again we had a continuation probability of five/six,
the (short-lived asset) equilibrium price given by
Equation (3) is 1.2. Once again, we had token incomes
varying cyclically and deterministically: type I sub-
jects had token incomes of 109, 53, 67, 109, 53, 67, and
so on; type 2 subjects had token incomes of 59, 123, 55,
59, 123, 55, and so on; type 3 subjects had token in-
comes of 69, 61, 115, 69, 61, 115, and so on. The
equilibrium is shown in Table 2. For example, type 1
should sell 30 tokens in period 1, getting 36 tokens
back if period 2 was reached and, if it was, should then
sell 10 tokens in period 2, getting back 12 if period 3 was
reached, and so on.
5. Main Results
In total, 288 subjects participated in the experiment:
12 subjects in each of six independent sessions for
each of the four treatments. The subjects’ average
age was 22.23, the average Cognitive Reflection Test-
score was 1.46,15 and 56.60%were female subjects. By
participating in the experiment, subjects earned an
average of £18.30. The experiment lasted on average
two hours including the reading of the instructions
and the private payment of cash to subjects. The
various treatments are summarised in Table 3.
As we have made clear from the start, there are two
key items of interest: (1) whether subjects managed
to consumption-smooth and (2) whether the price
Table 3. Experimental Treatments—Number of Sessions
Each with 12 Subjects
Market
Asset Credit
Payment function Step 6 6
Concave 6 6
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reached its equilibrium. We note that (1) is not a
necessary but is a sufficient condition for (2), as-
suming competitive-like behaviour in the markets.
This, however, depends on how the subjects behave.
Result 1 (Consumption Smoothing). (a) Consumption
smoothing is observed in each treatment. (b) Con-
sumption smoothing works better in the credit market
than in the asset market and better with the step pay-
ment function than with the concave payment function.
Figures 2 and 3 show the average payoffs in each
period of each session of the experiment. Table 4
summarises the average payoff by market and by
payment function. The efficient consumption level in
the experiment was 79 tokens, which implied a payoff
of £1 per period. The no-trade consumption level
implied a mean payoff per period of £0.333 with the
step payment function and £0.2033 (type 1), £0.1133
(type 2), and £0.68 (type 3) with the concave pay-
ment function.
a. The observed average payoff levels significantly
exceed the no-trade consumption level in eachmarket
and for each payment function (see Table 4).
b. The average payoffs recorded in Table 4 indicate
that the credit market has higher consumption levels
than the asset market for each payment function. The
payoff differences between the asset market and
credit market and the differences in the relative fre-
quency of efficient consumption levels are significant
at the 5% level for each payment function. The relative
frequencies of efficient consumption are also signif-
icantly different between the asset market and credit
market for both payment functions. In addition, the
differences between the payment functions are sig-
nificant for bothmarkets. The results of the two-tailed
two-sample Mann-Whitney tests are indicated in the
bottom lines of Table 4.16 In thefirst columnof Table 5,
we report further supportive evidence of the stated
treatment effects from a dummy regression with ro-
bust standard errors.
Result 2 (Equilibrium Pricing). (a) Close-to-equilibrium
pricing is observed in both the asset and credit markets
and with both the step and the concave payment
functions. (b) The asset market deviations from the
equilibrium price are larger in magnitude than in the
credit market.
a. Figures 4 and 5 show the average price trajec-
tories and the equilibrium price for each treatment
condition. Table 6 records the average prices, the average
Figures 2. (Color online) Average Payoff/Consumption with Step Function (Top: Asset Market, Bottom: Credit Market)
Note. A filled-in circle indicates the end of a sequence; the efficient payoff is £1.
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of the relative deviation, and the average of the absolute
relative deviation from the equilibrium price. These are
standard measures in the experimental asset market lit-
erature to identifymispricing (see Stöckl et al. 2010). The
relative deviation and the relative absolute deviation
are defined as follows.
Relative Deviation (RD) 
∑T




t1 |pt − Ep|
TEp
Figures 3. (Color online) Average Payoff/Consumption with the Concave Function (Top: Asset Market, Bottom:
Credit Market)
Note. A filled-in circle indicates the end of a sequence; the efficient payoff is £1.
Table 4. Consumption Smoothing—Average Payoff per Period and Efficient Consumption share
Treatment
Average payoff per period (significantly larger than the
no-trade outcome according to a Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test) Efficient consumption share
SA step asset market 0.712** 0.186
SC step credit market 0.855** 0.519
CA concave asset market 0.452** 0.012
CC concave credit market 0.742** 0.076
Two-tailed two-sample Mann-Whitney test results:
p-value re treatments SA vs. SC 0.004*** 0.004***
p-value re treatments CA vs. CC 0.004*** 0.005***
p-value re SA&CA vs. SC&CC 0.001*** 0.030**
p-value re SA&SC vs. CA&CC 0.006*** 0.000***
Note. The one-sampleWilcoxon signed-ranks test is conducted on the independent cohort average (n = 6); the two-sampleMann-Whitney test
is conducted on the independent cohort averages (n1 = n2 = 6).
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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The average prices are recorded in Table 6.17 In all
treatment conditions, we observe no significant dif-
ferences from equilibrium, as also indicted by the
relative deviation. In the step asset market, the de-
viation is economically large because the price in one
market (session SA4, see Figure 5) deviatesmore from
the equilibrium than the others. The two-tailed one-
sampleWilcoxon test of the hypothesis of equilibrium
pricing results insignificant at the 10% level; for the
step asset market treatment, the p-value is 0.60. The
recorded relative deviations suggest no significant dif-
ferences between treatments. The p-values are recorded
in the table.
b. There are differences in mispricing between
treatments. The differences from the equilibrium pre-
diction are suggested in Figures 4 and 5 by the spread
around the prediction, which is apparently smaller in
the credit market than in the asset market. The
Figure 4. (Color online) Average Prices with the Step Function (Top: Asset Market, Bottom: Credit Market)
Note. A filled-in circle indicates the end of a sequence; scale is five times the equilibrium price of 10.





Relative deviation (RD) of average
price from equilibrium in period
Relative abs deviation (RAD) of average
price from equilibrium in period
Constant 0.713*** −0.131 0.096
(29.6) (−1.12) (1.26)
AssetD −0.218** 0.099 0.380**
(2.64) (0.50) (2.64)
StepD 0.181*** 0.332 0.158
(6.82) (1.64) (1.07)
No. observations 534 534 534
No. clusters 24 24 24
R2 0.471 0.078 0.164
Notes. AssetD is an Asset Market Dummy equal to 1 in the asset market and 0 in the credit Market. StepD is a Step Treatment Dummy equal to 1
in the step treatments and equal to 0 in the concave treatments.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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absolute relative deviations that measure these de-
viations from the equilibrium prediction are signifi-
cantly smaller in the credit market than in the asset
market. The p-values of the two-tailed two-sample
Mann-Whitney are reported in Table 6. The payment
function, on the other hand, has no significant effect on
mispricing in terms of Relative Absolute Deviation
(RAD), but the price level measured by Relative Devi-
ation (RD) seems a bit lower with concave payment. The
regression analysis with robust standard errors reported
in Table 5 underlines these observations.
5.1. Robustness Check18
We have conducted the analysis in Tables 4 and 6 on
the data of the last sequence only, that is, the sequence
when subjects have the most familiarity with the
setting. All reported significance levels in Tables 4
and 6 are fully supported; in fact, significances tend
to increase. There is one difference: the relative deviation
Figure 5. (Color online) Average Prices with Concave Function (Top: Asset Market, Bottom: Credit Market)
Note. A filled-in circle indicates the end of a sequence; scale is five times the equilibrium price of 1.2.
Table 6. Average Price and Mispricing
Treatment
Average price (significant
differences of average price
from equilibrium would be
indicated)
Average relative deviation (RD)
(significant differences from




SA step asset market 13.52 .352 .648
SC step credit market 1.25 .045 .171
CA concave asset market 8.34 −.166 .419
CC concave credit market 1.15 −.046 .127
Two-tailed two-sample Mann-Whitney test results:
p-value re treatments SA vs. SC 0.873 0.036**
p-value re treatments CA vs. CC 0.149 0.010**
p-value re SA&CA vs. SC&CC 0.355 0.002***
p-value re SA&SC vs. CA&CC 0.094* 0.311
Note. The one-sample Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is conducted on the independent cohort average (n = 6) indicating no significant deviation
from equilibrium; the two-sample Mann-Whitney test is conducted on the independent cohort averages (n1 = n2 = 6).
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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from the equilibriumRD in the concave asset market is
significantly different (smaller) from the one in the
concave credit market. The Mann-Whitney test of this
difference yields a p-value of 0.055, whereas it is 0.149
in Table 6.
We note, in looking at the period-by-period prices
in Figures 4 and 5, that there appear to be bubbles
(partly burst) in the step asset sessions SA2 and SA5
and (burst) in the concave asset session CA2. We
suspect that these deviations from equilibrium are
due to hoarding; 19 we explore this possible explanation
in Section 7. We also note that bubbles in the credit
market sessions (Figures 4 and 5) are conspicuous by
their absence.
6. Pricing Uncertainty of Future Returns
One possible explanation for the larger deviations
from the equilibrium in the asset market compared
with the creditmarket is the uncertainty about pricing
of future claims. This uncertainty impacts the long-
term (asset) market differently from the short-term
(credit) market. In the credit market, this uncertainty
Figure 6. (Color online) Expected and Observed Term Structure of Return, Standard Deviation, and Sharpe Ratio
Note. Credit market represents the short-lived claims and asset market the long-lived claims.
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does not exist, because the return of tomorrow is fixed
today. The standard deviation of returns represents
an ex post measure of this uncertainty. The price for
return uncertainty is frequently represented in the
Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio measures the risk-
adjusted return of an investment, in particular, its






R denotes the return of the risky investment, Rf the
return on the risk-free investment, and the standard
deviation of the risky return measures the risk of
the investment. Standard theory suggests that in-
vestors prefer a high to a low Sharpe ratio. Because
we have no risk-free rate in our experimental setting,
we compute the Sharpe ratio as the ratio of return
to standard deviation of the return. The return on
the long-lived asset is the sum of capital gain yield
and dividend yield, that is, Rt = (pLt + dt)/pLt-1 − 1.
The return on the short-lived asset is simply the price
minus cost, Rt = pSt-1 − 1. In fact, these are the returns
when the sequence does not expire in period t-1. If the
sequence expires, the return is −1. Therefore, the
expected return for both short-term and long-lived
claims is zero in our setup and the variance is 0.183.20
The equilibrium Sharpe ratio is constant at zero for
short-lived and long-lived claims. To estimate the
Sharpe ratio from our data, we use the return on the
average price of the period and the standard devia-
tions across all returns in a session. Note that the
recent empirical literature reports a decreasing pat-
tern of Sharpe ratios (van Binsbergen et al. 2012, van
Binsbergen and Koijen 2017). Van Binsbergen and
collaborators attribute this decreasing empirical pattern
of Sharpe ratios to the empirical risk of rare disasters
which hits long-lived returns more than short-lived
returns. In our setup, of course, risk of rare disasters
is absent.
Result 3 (Sharpe Ratio Structure). The term structure of
Sharpe ratios is nondecreasing.
Figure 6 shows the term structures of return, standard
deviation, and Sharpe ratio in our experiment. The
corresponding numbers of average Sharpe ratios, the
average returns, and average standard deviations are
recorded in Table 7 for each treatment. As indicated in
the table, the Sharpe ratio deviates significantly from
the equilibrium prediction in the concave payment
asset market treatment. In the step level payment
treatment, the signs are the same; but statistical sig-
nificance is not achieved at the 10% level. Overall, we
find significantly higher Sharpe ratios for long-lived
than for short-lived asset returns. The Sharpe ratios of
short-lived asset returns are not different from the
equilibrium prediction of zero.
Table 7. Average Return, Standard Deviation and Sharpe Ratio
Treatment
Average return R (significant
differences from expected Sharpe
ratio of zero indicated)
Average standard deviation σ
(significant differences from
equilibrium prediction of 0.428
indicated)
Sharpe ratio R/σ (significant
differences from expected Sharpe
ratio of zero are indicated)
SA (step asset market) 0.038 0.532 0.115
SC (step credit market) −0.013 0.576** −0.021
CA (concave asset market) 0.179** 0.577 0.313**
CC (concave credit market) −0.011 0.480 −0.042
Two-tailed two-sample Mann-Whitney test results:
p-value re treatments SA vs. SC 0.262 0.749 0.337
p-value re treatments CA vs. CC 0.055* 0.631 0.078*
p-value re SA&CA vs. SC&CC 0.015** 0.817 0.024**
p-value re SA&SC vs. CA&CC 0.184 0.356 0.184
Note. The one-sampleWilcoxon signed-ranks test is conducted on the independent cohort average (n = 6); the two-sampleMann-Whitney test is
conducted on the independent cohort averages (n1 = n2 = 6).
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Table 8. Regression Results on Efficiency Levels and
Mispricing of Market Institutions on Concentration
of Claims
Explanatory variable Average Pay RD RAD
Constant 0.779*** 0.022 0.140***
(20.1) (0.710) (7.84)
HHI 0.072 0.019 0.112*
(0.79) (0.11) (1.73)
AssetD −0.063 −0.384 0.028
(−1.08) (−1.67) (0.17)
AssetD x hhi −0.800*** 2.80*** 2.09***
(−4.43) (7.76) (6.48)
No. observations 534 534 534
No. clusters 24 24 12
R2 0.352 0.132 0.252
Note. AssetD is an Asset Market Dummy equal to 1 in the asset
market and 0 in the credit Market.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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Result 3 is rather opposite to the one reported in
van Binsbergen and Koijen (2017): under laboratory
conditions, we failed to reproduce the declining pattern
of term-structure of Sharpe ratios observed in real-world
data (van Binsbergen and Koijen 2017). The likely
reason is that our experimental design involves no
rare disasters risks. The pattern in our data suggests
that investors in the asset market request a premium
for the uncertainty about future prices. Asparouhova
et al. (2016, p. 2731) reach a related conclusion on
the failure of rational expectations to predict price
volatility observed in the data, given a complicated
environment: “Agents have to form expectations about
endogenous uncertainty, [. . . whereas theory assumes]
that agents know the (endogenous) mapping from
states to prices.”
7. Rationale for Mispricing and
Efficiency Losses
As pointed out above, the uncertainty of future prices
impacts the long-term (asset) market differently from
the short-term (credit) market. To insure against the
uncertainty about future prices, subjects in the asset
market could start hoarding assets. In the credit mar-
ket, subjects have no opportunity to hoard the short-
term claim, because the claim of today has ceased to
live tomorrow.
A way to investigate nonequilibrium behaviour as
hoarding is in the measurement of market concentra-
tion. Competitive equilibrium assumes a “sufficiently
large” number of participants. Although many other,
usually simpler, experiments have observed competitive
behaviour with n = 12 or fewer subjects, perhaps this
experiment is too complex and had too few subjects.
It is possible that some subjects realised that the
market was not truly competitive and hence that they
could try and impose some monopolistic power. One
obvious way to do this in the asset market sessions
was to try and build up a large asset holding and then
hold out for high prices when offering to sell. So, if the
assets became concentrated in the hands of a small
number of subjects, prices could be forced upwards.
One measure of concentration (in the holding of as-







where sit is the share of future claims of subject i (=
1..N) of outstanding claims at the end of the period. In the
asset market, sit is the subject’s asset holding relative
to 40 outstanding assets.21 In the credit market, sit is
the subject’s number of next-period tokens at the end
of the period relative to the endogenous sum of all next-
period tokens.One hypothesis, therefore, is that the price
in the asset marketmay be an increasing function of hhi,
leading to mispricing and allocative inefficiency.
Result 4 (Investor Concentration). The Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index helps to explain the differences be-
tween treatments in (a) efficiency and (b) mispricing.
a. In the first column of Table 8, we report re-
gression results with robust standard errors that
indicate the effect of investor concentration on effi-
ciency. The result suggests that the difference be-
tween the asset market and the credit market can be
reduced to the difference of the sensitivity of investor
concentration. When the claims concentration is high
in the asset market, the payoff is significantly reduced
compared with the credit market. In Tables 9a and 9b,
we report the effect of share concentration for con-
cave payment and step payment separately.
Table 9a. Regression Results on Efficiency Levels and
Mispricing of Market Institutions on Concentration of
Claims (Concave Treatment)
Explanatory variables Average Pay RD RAD
Constant 0.707*** 0.048 0.167***
(13.0) (0.50) (7.63)
HHI 0.158 −0.147 −0.034
(0.96) (−0.57) (−0.25)
AssetD −0.123* −0.846*** −0.214*
(−1.95) (−5.95) (−1.97)
AssetD x hhi −0.822*** 3.44*** 2.47***
(−4.42) (6.64) (7.97)
No. observations 270 270 270
No. clusters 12 12 6
R2 0.465 0.423 0.415
Note. AssetD is an Asset Market Dummy equal to 1 in the asset
market and 0 in the credit Market.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Table 9b. Regression Results on Efficiency Levels and
Mispricing of Market Institutions on Concentration of
Claims (Step Treatment)
Explanatory variables Average Pay RD RAD
Constant 0.876*** 0.027 0.137***
(68.8) (0.46) (5.73)
HHI −0.071 0.070 0.166**
(−1.32) (0.37) (2.43)
AssetD −0.079** −0.057 0.193
(−2.88) (−0.15) (0.65)
AssetD × hhi −0.451*** 2.74* 2.03
(−4.87) (2.00) (1.68)
No. observations 264 264 264
No. clusters 12 12 12
R2 0.455 0.132 0.232
Note. AssetD is an Asset Market Dummy equal to 1 in the asset
market and 0 in the credit Market.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Carbone, Hey, and Neugebauer: An Experimental Comparison of Two Exchange Economies
14 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–17, © 2021 The Author(s)
b. The third column in the Table 8, as well as in
Tables 9a and 9b, show the dependence of mispricing
in terms of the relative absolute deviation from equi-
librium pricing on investor concentration. The result
shows that investor concentration has a small but
significant general impact on mispricing. However,
this effect is significantly increased in the asset market
treatment, as is revealed by the significance of the in-
teraction effect. The interaction effect is particularly
important in the asset market with the concave payoff
function. Interestingly, the effect of the investor con-
centration seems to have a positive sign as is indicated
in the second column where we report the impact of
investor concentration on the relative deviation from
equilibrium price. Thus, the data suggest that asset
market prices are higher when investor concentra-
tion increases.
In Table 10, we show the average hhi numbers for
each treatment and indicate the difference from the
predicted hhi numbers. Interestingly, the deviations
from the predicted values in the asset market are not
higher than in the credit market. Yet, share concen-
tration has a different impact in the market for short-
term claims than in the long-term asset market.
We also looked at alternative explanations why
efficiency and mispricing is worse in the asset market
than in the credit market.22 However, no alternative
story captures the differences as well as the hhi. Our
data suggest that asset duration, price volatility, and
hoarding are closely related with another. The cau-
sality of this relationship could be an interesting
question for future research.
8. Conclusions
The key results from this experiment on the Lucas tree
model are that subjects do seem to manage to con-
sumption smooth and that prices do approach the
equilibrium. These key findings are similar to the
results from Crockett et al. (2019), though our ex-
periments generalise theirs in going from an oscillating
formulation to a cyclical formulation. Besides the
market for long-lived assets, we extend their analysis
by analysing also a credit market in which short-lived
claims are traded. This appears to be a first imple-
mentation in the laboratory of the Bewley heterogeneous
agent model (Ljungqvist and Sargent 2004). Because
our experiment has no economic risk other than the
continuation risk, both models imply the same equilib-
rium consumption vectors of agents.
Interestingly, performance in both these key as-
pects (consumption smoothing and equilibriumpricing)
tends to be better in the credit market. Our data analysis
shows that concentration of holdings (indicating the use
of monopoly power) affects efficiency.
We observe mispricing in the market of the long-
lived asset. Our data suggest that uncompetitive
behaviour, that is, hoarding of assets, is a key source
of this mispricing. For both pricing and efficiency, the
market for long-lived assets results in larger devia-
tions from the equilibrium than the market for short-
lived assets.
The suggested reason for the larger deviations from
the equilibrium in the assetmarket comparedwith the
credit market is the uncertainty about pricing of fu-
ture claims. This uncertainty impacts the long-term
(asset) market differently from the short-term (credit)
market. To insure against the uncertainty about fu-
ture prices, subjects in the asset market may be mo-
tivated to hoard assets. In the credit market, this
uncertainty does not exist and subjects have no op-
portunity to hoard the short-term claim because the
claim of today has ceased to live tomorrow.
Our paper contributes to the discussion on the term
structure of returns. The recent empirical literature
observes a declining term structure of Sharpe ratios in
real-world markets (van Binsbergen et al. 2012, van
Binsbergen and Koijen 2017). Van Binsbergen and
collaborators report that this observation contrasts
with the prediction of standard models that suggest
no lower risk adjusted returns on long-term assets
than on short-term assets. It seems interesting that
under controlled laboratory conditions, we find no
declining term structure, in particular, because van
Binsbergen and Koijen (2017) believe that the de-
clining term structure could be key to the explanation
of puzzles in finance as, for instance, related to equity
premium and excess volatility. Future experiments
shall address the question whether the term structure
of returns reverts in the presence of disaster risk. This
feature is absent from our study.
Table 10. Average hhi Measures Across Periods and Treatments
Treatment Period 1, 4, 7, . . . Period 2, 5, 8, . . . Period 3, 6, 9, . . .
Asset market equilibrium 0.085 0.135 0.125
SA (step asset market) 0.149 0.174 0.182
CA (concave asset market) 0.174 0.193 0.204
Credit market equilibrium 0.194 0.139 n/d
SC (step credit market) 0.288 0.261 0.333
CC (concave credit market) 0.257 0.262 0.284
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The main question of our study has been whether
long-lived assets or short-lived assets are preferable
for consumption smoothing. The bottom line would
appear to be that a market for long-lived assets can
help people to consumption smooth but that a market
for short-lived assets does it better.
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Endnotes
1We considered alternative terminologies—forward market, futures
market, cash-in-advance market—and finally settled on this.
2The step function implies stronger marginal buy/sell incentives,
pushing subjects toward consumption smoothing. In a high-income
period, a subject starts with extra cash (more than 79) that is worthless
unless shifted to the next period, whereas in a low-income (less than
79) period, the subject has a very strong incentive to acquire more
cash in the current period to reach the threshold.
3Earlier contributions like Forsythe et al. (1982) and Friedman et al.
(1984), and more recent contributions like Noussair and Tucker
(2006), show that the future market is more efficient than the spot
market and that if there is a future market available, the spot market
converges to the equilibrium price more efficiently. However, these
experiments do not have a consumption smoothing dimension.
4Bewley (1983) proves monetary equilibrium existence. Following
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), we adopt the term Bewley model,
whereas Heathcote et al. (2009) refer to the standard incomplete
markets model. In the equilibriumwith many agents, households are
able to consume or trade units of the endowment. Trade occurs in
exchange for a promise of R units of consumption next period, that
is, a one-period credit contract.
5Bosch-Rosa (2017) studies rollover risk of maturities in a bank-run
type of laboratory experiment. The data suggest that short-term
maturities behave less vulnerable in economic downturns than
long-term maturities. The absence of macroeconomic cycles in our
experiment could potentially explain why the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe
1994) in our short-lived security does not exceed that of our long-
lived security.
6Note that u(.) is not the DM (Decision Maker)’s utility function over
money but is the conversion (into money) of the end-of-period
consumption. Crockett et al. (2019) explore the effect of the DM
having a concave function over money earned in the experiment.
They show that this implies a lower equilibrium price than that de-
rived here. This may explain some of our experimental findings.
7This short-term price terminology, which is somewhat unusual for a
credit instrument, is in line with our experimental implementation.
We chose this implementation to give the predicted equilibrium
price a chance to prevail as transaction price in the experiment.
Standard discounting terminology, which we have applied to the
long-term asset, would require the statement of today’s price in
exchange for a promise of one cash-unit tomorrow. The equilibrium
price in this formulation would equal the continuation probability
of (five/six) in the experiment, which cannot prevail as transaction
price in the market as subjects enter their limit orders in decimals.
8 It is a loudspeaker system in the laboratory, so that all subjects
could hear.
9They can be found in the supplementary material.
10Again available in the supplementary material.
11For inexperienced subjects, the quantity/quantity mask was ap-
parently useful. It was the more frequent choice for order submission
in the first five periods (50.7%–57.6% of limit orders). On average,
however, subjects chose more frequently to submit their orders
through the price/quantity mask (54.9%).
12A subject could submit an unlimited number of buy and sell orders
to the market. The latest submission would be outstanding in the
order book until filled or replaced with a new limit order of
the submitter.
13The program can be found on the site, as can the questionnaire
administered at the end of the experiment.
14 In the unlikely event that no six was thrown between one and two
hours, we told the subjects that we would stop the experiment that
day and continue it on another. In practice, this never happened.
15 Subjects were asked to answer the three questions of the cogni-
tive reflection test CRT (Frederick 2005) in the debriefings. The CRT-
scoremeasures the cognitive abilities of subjects. The individual CRT-
score can take numbers between zero and three. Subjects with a
higher CRT-score usually have a higher payoff in market experi-
ments (e.g., Corgnet et al. 2014, Breaban andNoussair 2015, Charness
and Neugebauer 2019). The average CRT-score of our sample is
comparable to 1.43 measured with Harvard University students as
reported in Frederick (2005). The CRT questions were (1) A hat and a
suit cost $110. The suit costs $100 more than the hat. Howmuch does
the hat cost? (2) If it takes five machines five minutes to make five
widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 wid-
gets? (3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake,
how long would it take for the patch to cover half of it?
16The differences between the step asset market and the concave
credit market treatments are not significant; the p-values are 0.337
(average) and 0.109 (efficient consumption), respectively.
17Note that in the concave asset market and the concave credit
market, average prices are below the equilibrium. This could be be-
cause our subjects were risk averse with respect to the money earned
in the experiment (see Endnote 7 in Section 3). Elsewhere (particularly
in the step asset market), market average prices are above the equi-
librium; this seems to be due to the bubbles that we discuss later.
18We appreciate that the results in this section, and the next depend
upon the stochastic specification implicit in the analyses; we have
explored alternative specifications and are happy that our results
are robust.
19Crockett et al. (2019) suggested that some subjects hoarded assets,
in particular, in the treatment with a linear payoff function.
20The Expected Return (ER) and the variance of the return (VAR(R))
are given by: E(R) = 0.2× 5/6 + (−1)× 1/6 = 0, andVAR(R) = 0.22× 5/
6 + (−1)2 × 1/6, where 0.2 and −1 are the possible returns and 5/6 and
1/6 the corresponding probabilities. The standard deviation in
equilibrium is thus 0.428.
21 In equilibrium the hhit varies between periods. In the asset market,
the predicted three-period hhit-cycle is {0.085, 0.135, 0.0125} and in the
credit market {0.194, 0.139, not defined}.
22For instance, we looked at subjects’ retrading of claims within a
period, which is a departure from the equilibrium prediction. In
equilibrium, subjects trade the optimal quantity at the equilibriumprice
in order to smooth their consumption. In the experiment, some subjects
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buy and sell, that is, they retrade claims of assets within the same
period. Related literature suggests that retrading of assets would be a
symptom of speculation (Lei et al. 2001, Dickhaut et al. 2012, and
Gjerstad et al. 2015), and Hirota et al. (2018) report that mispricing
increases with the required number of retrades across periods. In our
experiment, the transaction volume is related to retrading behaviour.
Retrade may not be independent of investor concentration. Impor-
tantly, we find that the significance of hhi at explaining deviations from
equilibrium is apparently better than the one offered by the retrading
data of subjects. Therefore, we have decided not to report the data
analysis on retrade in the paper. We also looked at possible mistakes
that subjects make at perceiving continuation probabilities. If subjects
exhibit the gambler’s fallacy, perceived continuation probabilities may
decrease. To the contrary, if subjects exhibit the hot-hand effect, per-
ceived continuation probabilities can increase. Nonetheless, a regres-
sion of the overall data suggests no significant effect of sequence length
on mispricing or efficiency. Finally, gender seems also to have no clear
effect on efficiency and mispricing in our data.
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